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I HE FAILURE rate of banks and thrifts has
exploded over the past decade, making reform
of the deposit insurance system a topic of con-
siderable interest to regulators, bankers) and
economists. As illustrated by figure 1, which
shows the total number of failed commercial
banks (excluding thrifts) for each year since the
chartering of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), the annual number of commer-
cial hank failures in each of the last several
years has exceeded its previous peak, attained
during the Great Depression. The status of the
thrift industry is even more gritn, with losses to
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSL1C) estimated at $160 billion or
more. The primary consequence of these fail-
ures for public policy is the enormous losses,
especially to the FSLIC, as depositors in these
failed institutions are reimbursed.
This article considers a particular set of eco-
nomic tools used to evaluate deposit insurance.’
Option pricing models am’e among the techniques
available for analyzing the deposit insurance
system. These models can he used to assign
specific values to the claims of each of the in-
terested parties involved in the deposit insur-
ance system — the insurer, financial institutions,
and depositors. Such valuations can then he
used, for example, to estimate the net value of
the government’s insurance fund or to deter-
tnine a fair price that a bank should pay for its
insurance. More generally, by comparing in-
surance valuations with different model parame-
ters, one can investigate the system of incen-
tives under a given regulatory schemne, such as
the risk incentives for hank shareholders and
depositot’s under the present system. Finally,
comparisons of insurance values and incentives
can be made across various proposed regulatory
schemes. These applications are illustrated be-
low with some examples.
‘The usefulness of option pricing models for
evaluating deposit insurance is of special in-
terest for two reasons. First, the consensus
among the interested parties is that the present
deposit insurance systetn has contributed to the
current crisis. Second, in the context of this
debate, a number of economists have used the
iThis article does not addness the issue of why we should
have deposit insurance. The rationale for the current
system of bank regulation and for deposit insurance in
particular is based on two related principles: protection of
the depositor and the mitigation of contagious bank runs.
See FDIC (1984) and U. S. Treasury (1985). Benston and
Kaufman (1988) identify three reasons for bank regulation
in addition to the two traditional rationales, namely disrup-
tion to communities from localized bank failures, moral
hazard induced by deposit insurance and restrictions on
competition.Figure 1
Bank Failures (Insured and
Uninsured)




modern theory of option pricing to explain the
incentives and measure the costs both of the
current system of deposit insurance and of
some suggested alternatives. This paper pre-
sents the basic theory of option pricing, explains
how it can be applied to deposit insurance, and
analyzes some of the issues involved in its use.
A L:.Ti.MELI (JPT.HI.) PRICING
This paper presumes no knowledge of options
or of the various economic models that have
been used in the academic literature to assign
values to options. Thus, it begins with a brief
description of options and some of the major
contributions to the theory of pricing options
that have been made in the past two decades.
Cmhigenf ~
A call option is a legal contract that gives its
owner the right to buy a specified asset at a fix-
ed price on a specified date,~Similarly, a put op-
tion gives its owner the right to sell a specified
asset at a fixed price on a specified date. Option
contracts are usually sold by one party to an-
other.’ The person who owns an option con-
tract is called the holder of the option. The per-
son who sells an option contract — that is, the
person who will be compelled to perform if the
option holder invokes her right as specified in
the contract — is called the writer of the option.
The act of invoking the contract is called eyer-
cising the option. The fixed price identified by
the option contract is called the striking price.
The date at which the option can he exercised
is called the eypiration date of the option.
120 These legal contracts are probably best known
by the stock options that are bought and sold
by brokers in the trading pits of organized op-
tions exchanges in Chicago, New York and
elsewhere, In addition to options on common
40 stock, there are active markets fom’ options on
agricultural commodity futures, foreign curren-
0 cies, stock index portfolios, and government
securities, to name only a few. The definition of
an option, however, does not limit the term to
those contracts actively traded on the floors of
organized financial exchanges. By definition, an
option is any appropriately constructed legal
contract between the writer and the holder,
regardless of whether it is ever traded,
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Consider now the value to the holder of an
expiring put option, as illustrated in figure 2,
The value of the underlying asset specified by
the contract is given on the horizontal axis,
while the value of the option itself is given on
the vertical axis- The point K on the horizontal
axis is the specified striking price for the asset,
If the value of the underlying asset is above the
stm’iking price on the expiration date, then the
put option will not be exercised; anyone who
truly wanted to sell the asset would do so
outright at the going price, rather than using
the option and receiving the striking price. In
this case, the option expires worthless, and the
option holder experiences no gain or loss on the
expiration date.
On the other hand, if the value of the asset is
below the striking price, then the holder will
exercise her option and receive the striking
2This definition is a paraphrase of the definition given by
Cox and Rubinstein (1985), p. 1, It describes a “Euro-
pean” option, which is distinguished from an “American”
option. An American option gives its owner the right to buy
at any time on or before the specified date.
not compel the owner of the contract to do anything.
Although they are valuable, nothing in the definition of an
option requires that they be offered for sale; that is, their
value does not depend on how they were obtained,
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3They are sold, because options have a non-negative value;
because they are a right to buy (or sell) the asset, they doFigure 2
Value of Put Option to Holder
price for the asset. In this case, her net gain on
the expiration date will he (K — A
7
), the differ-
ence between the striking price and the current
price, since she can turn around and replace
the asset immediately, if she wants to, Thus, the
expiration value of the option and the decision
about whether to exercise are contingent upon
the value of the underlying asset at that time:
(1) State Action Option value
AT < K Exercise P = K — A7
A7 K No exercise P = 0.
For this reason, options are also referred to as
“contingent claims” on the underlying assets,
The corresponding net payoffs to the writer
of the put option are given in figure 3, Notice
that his payoffs are exactly the inverse of those
for the option holder, Also note that the payoff
at expiration to the writer of an option is never
positive; at best it is zero. It is for this reason
that options are sold to the holder, rather than
being given away free of charge. ‘t’he price in-
itially paid for the option — the option price or
option premium — could be incorporated into
the figures by simply shifting the holder’s
payoffs down and the writer’s payoffs up by
the appropriate amount.
The payoffs at expiration to the holder and
writer of a call option are given in figures 4
and 5, respectively. The corresponding analysis
for’ call options is precisely analogous to the
analysis just given for put options.
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Having described the value of an option at ex-
piration leaves the question of its value prior to
expiration unanswered. Instead of being a sim-
ple function of A and K, the value of an option
before maturity depends on several additional
factors. Although a number of bounds had been
placed on the value of an unexpited option by
using relatively simple arbitrage arguments, an
important advance in the valuation of unexpired
options was made by Black and Scholes (j973)4
They obtained an exact equation for the value
of a put option under an unrestrictive set of
assumptions.~Their result has since been dab-
orated and generalized by others.’
In their model, the value of an unexpired op-
tion depends on five things:
4For an exposition of the arbitrage bounds on option prices,
see Merton (1973), or Cox and Rubinstein, ch, 4.
‘Almost alt derivations of option pricing models, including
that of Black and Scholes, are stated in terms of call
rather than put options, As it happens, this distinction is
largely irrelevant, because call option valuations are readi-
ly converted to put option valuations, and vice-versa, via
an arbitrage relationship known as “put-call parity”. Put-
call parity is an exact relationship for European options
and an approximate one for American options (see Cox
and Rubinstein, pp. 150-52); throughout this paper it is
treated as exact. Put-call parity is first presented by Stoll
(1969).
‘One such generalization is found in the shaded insert. For
a partial survey of option pricing models, see Cox and
Rubinstein, ch. 7.
Expiration Value of Option
Figure 3
Value of Underlying Asset at Expiration
Value of Put Option to Writer
0 K
value of Underlying Asset at Expiration22
K = the striking price
A = the current asset price
T = the time remaining to expiration
a = the volatility of the asset price
B = the risk-free interest rate,
Almost as notable is what the option’s value
does not depend on: any characteristic of the
holder or the writer! Under their assumptions,
Black and Scholes are able to include an option
in a riskless portfolio. Such a portfolio must
earn the risk-free interest rate, and they are
able to use this result, along with an assumption
about the probability distribution of the asset
price, to identify an exact value, P, for a put
option:
P = (K’e—RT).N(X+rnfñ — A-N(X),
where:
x = ..J.. [ln(K.e’RT)_ln(A)] — ½a’ff
N() = the —Jstandard normal cumulative
probability function
ln() = the natural logarithm function
e = the base of the natural logarithm
Although this formula may at first appear
complicated, a rough intuition can be provided
relatively painlessly.’ First, e_RT is just the pre-
sent value discount factor for T periods at in-
terest rate B with continuous compounding, so
that K’e~’~T is the present value of the striking
price. Keeping in mind that N(X+ crti5 is a pro-
bability, the first term is the expected present
value of the striking price at expiration, given
that A7
< K, Similarly, the second term, AN(X),
is the expected present value of the expiration-
day asset price, again given that A7
< K,’ ‘l’hus,
the value of the option is the expected present
value of its value at expiration, given by condi-
tion I above.
Unfortunately, no easy, correct interpretation
can be attached to the specific probabilities,
N(X+ ø’ñï and N(X), in the two terms. These
Figure 4
Value of Call Option to Holder
Expiration Value of Option
0
0 K
Value of Underlying Asset at Expiration
Value of Call Option to Writer
probabilities are closely related to the probabili-
ty that A7
< K, but they are not quite the
same, because the present value of the striking
price is known with certainty, whereas the pre-
sent value of the asset’s price on the expiration
day, AT.eTtT, is not; the current asset price, A,
appears instead,
7For example, one might suspect that the holder’s attitudes
toward risk or her beliefs about the asset price at expira-
tion should influence the option’s value to her. This is not
the case, however. Also note that four of the five factors,
at least theoretically, are well-defined and directly obser-
vable at the time of valuation. The exception is asset
volatility, which must be estimated from observable fac-
tors; see Cox and Rubinstein, pp. 280-87, for an example
of an estimation technique.
‘A full derivation of the formula is fairly involved and will
not be presented here. Interested readers are referred to
Malliaris (1983) for a mathematically advanced approach
or to Cox and Rubinstein, ch. 5, for a longer but less
technical derivation.
‘The corresponding expected present values for the case
when A7 is greater than K are both zero, because then the
expiring option is worthless and will not be exercised;




Value of Underlying Asset at Expiration23
In spite of its complexity, the option pricing
equation is still a useful tool. In one sense, the
formula can be treated as a black box in which
the five parameters (K, A, T, a and B) enter at
one end, and the value of the put option, P,
comes out at the other; a computer spreadsheet
or calculator can be programmed to perform
the intervening calculations defined by the for-
mula, For example, if the current asset value is
A = $985, the standard deviation of asset
returns is a = 0,3 percent, the striking price of
the option is K = $1000, the time to expiration
is one year, and the riskless interest rate is &
percent per year, then the Black-Scholes equa-
tion tells us that the put option is worth $8545,
Figure 6 graphs the Black-Scholes value of a put
option for a range of current asset values from
zero to $1500, where the values of the other
four parameters are the ones just given.
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Not surprisingly, the distribution of asset
prices is a crucial factor in determining the ex-
act form of the option pricing equation. In their
derivation, Black and Scholes assumed that the
price of the underlying asset progressed ran-
domly through time according to geometric
Brownian motion, This is the assumption that
leads to the specific normal probability func-
tions in their pricing equation.
Brownian motion was first used to describe
the random progress of a single molecule
through a gas from a given starting point.’’ It is
a mathematical model of motion that identifies
the way the particle can move. Three restric-
tions are implied by Brownian motion:
1)The path followed must be continuous;”
2)All future movements are independent of
all past movements;12
3)The change in position between time s and
time t is normally distributed with mean
equal to zero and a standard deviation
equal to
Note that standard deviation is directly pro-
portional to the amount of time that has passed.
Figure 6
Value of Put Option to Holder
Optton Value Prior to Maturity







Thus, the longer one waits, the less certain one
is about the location of the molecule, or, in our
case, the price of the asset.
Simple Brownian motion is not completely
satisfactory for describing asset prices, how-
ever. While a normally distributed random vari-
able can take on negative values, an asset price
cannot. Therefore, geometric Brownian motion,
a variant, is assumed for the Black-Scholes
model.” Under geometric Brownian motion, the
third restriction is modified, so that the loga-
rithm of the change in position, rather than the
‘°Weare here concerned with only a single dimension of
motion, for example, the East-West coordinate of the
molecule or the price of an asset.
“Although this may be true of molecules, it need not be the
case for asset prices, as is considered in the shaded in-
sert on Merton’s lump-diffusion model,
“This implies, for example, that the molecule cannot build
up momentum or that prices do not have a predictable
trend. It does not mean that the future location is indepen-
dent of the past location,
“By way of terminology, simple Brownian motion (also
known as arithmetic Brownian motion) and geometric
Brownian motion are examples of the Wiener process (also
known as the Gauss-Wiener process), which, in turn, is a
special case of the Ito process,
Asset Value
Value of Net Asset Position
0 A=750 1500
Asset Valuechange in position itself, is normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation a’J(t — s).
This distributional assumption gives us the spe-
cific functional form which appears in the Black-
Scholes equation. Thus, this assumption is im-
portant: a different distribution would generally
yield a different pricing equation, as illustrated
by Merton’s (1976) jump-diffusion option pricing
model, which is presented in the shaded insert
on the opposite page.
The option pricing equation has the paradox-
ical property that, although risk (as measured
by volatility in the asset price) is itself a factor
in the option’s value, the attitudes toward risk
of the holder and the writer (and anyone else)
are not. The option’s value is a function of five
variables, none of which depends on the charac-
teristics of the individuals involved. Black and
Scholes achieved this by showing that the op-
tion can be made part of a completely hedged
(that is, riskless) portfolio. Any option writer
who offered a risk discount when selling an op-
tion would find himself selling many option con-
tracts to investors who, in turn, could hedge
the risk completely and pocket the risk discount
as an arbitrage profit. It is for this reason that
the discount rate which appears in the pricing
equation is the risk-free rate of interest, and at-
titudes toward risk are irrelevant to the value
of the option.
‘Fo see how the hedged portfolio works, con-
sider the value of a put option to the holder
before expiration, depicted in figure 6, and the
value of the underlying asset purchased for the
amount A, depicted in figure 7. The value of
the net asset investment increases one for one
as the price of the asset increases, and the val-
ue of the option decreases, although not in a
constant proportion.
The key to the hedged portfolio is to buy put
options and underlying assets in the appropriate
ratio, so that, when the asset price increases,
the increase in value of the net asset investment
will be precisely offset by the decrease in value
of the option position, and vice-versa. This im-
plies a riskless total portfolio. Of course, the ap-
propriate ratio (called the “hedge ratio” or “op-
tion delta”) also changes as the asset price
changes, because the value of a put option does
not decrease as a constant proportion of the
asset value (the put option’s value is represented
by a curved line). This implies that the holder
of a completely hedged portfolio must con-
tinuously adjust the relative proportions of op-
tions to assets if the hedged portfolio is to re-
main riskless. Black and Scholes presume that at
least some investors are large and sophisticated
enough to do this.
Because the risk of an option can be com-
pletely diversified, the risk-free rate is the ap-
propriate interest rate to use for discounting
the option’s uncertain payoff at expiration.
Nevertheless, the risk (defined as price volatility)
of the underlying asset is a factor in the op-
tion’s value, because asset risk affects the ex-
pected value of the option’s payoff. This is due
to the limited liability nature of the option.
Although increasing the volatility of the asset
price increases both the chance of getting a
very high expiration-day asset price and the
chance of getting a very low expiration-day
asset price, the bad (high price) outcomes all
have a weight of zero in the put option valua-
tion, while the good (low price) outcomes have
a weight of (K — A7). The volatility of the op-
tion’s value also increases with that of the asset
price, but the volatility of the option’s value is
irrelevant, because it can be completely hedged.
IJEP(i)SIT ~ ~%JVI.)
The analysis of deposit insurance is a natural,
albeit not obvious, extension of option pricing
models. The connection between the two comes
through the limited liability property common
to both options and common stock,” This pro-
perty implies an “expiration-day” payoff for
deposit insurance that can be modeled as an or-
dinary put option. Similarly, other claims on a
financial intermediary’s assets can be modeled
as options or combinations of options. The
benefit is that, given such a model, option pric-
ing theory allows us to assign values to each of
the claims. These values are the key to option
pricing’s usefulness in this context, because they
allow two sorts of comparisons to be made.
First, variations in the parameters of the op-
tion pricing equation can be considered.” Such
variations are of special interest, because, in the
MThis connection was first made by Black and Scholes and
first applied to deposit insurance by Merton (1977).
“For example, in Black and Scholes’ model, the five
















































































































































































Second, various deposit insurance structures
can he compared. The structure of deposit in-
surance is defined here by the number and
type of options pertaining to each of the in-
tet-ested parties. Changes in deposit insurance
structure are different from the parameter
changes within an insurance structure, con-
sidered in the preceding paragraph. Thus, for
example, the FDIC could use option models to
estimate the net increase or decrease in the pre-
sent value of the insurance fund caused by a
switch from one structure to another; or it
could examine the change in risk incentives oc-
casioned by the same switch. ‘I’hree different
structures, illustrating some of the issues involv-
ed, are presented in the following examples.”
.1 UG .Per-zI0/nt .t1CposffI .jnsurance
4- .5-’-.-- —.55-—--’--
tC 15-4-5-4 c4O4-:
To see how deposit insurance and options are
related, consider the following simplified bank-
ing scenario. A single banker both owns and
runs a bank, a single large depositor provides
the entire liability portfolio of the bank, and a
single insurer, the FDIC, insures deposits and
will liquidate the bank in the event of insolven-
cy-.’7 The liability pottfolio consists of a single
deposit due at year-end. Also at year-end, the
FDIC examines the bank to determine the value
of assets, which will, in turn, determine wheth-
er liquidation occurs. If the hank is economi-
cally insolvent, it is closed by the FDIC, which
liquidates the assets at market values and pays
off the depositor in full,” If the bank is eco-
nomically solvent, control remains with the
banker, who can either renegotiate the deposit
or liquidate the bank.
Now considet- the payoffs to the thtee in-
terested parties — hanket-, FDIC and depositor
— when the year-end audit is performed. These
payoffs are illustrated in figures 8-10. Each par-
ty’s year-end payoff is plotted as a function of
the year-end value of the hank’s assets. Note
that the sum of the payoffs to all of the parties
(obtained by adding the graphs vertically) equals
the value of the bank’s assets. These functions
show how the bank’s assets will be distributed
after the audit is performed. Also note the
shape of the payoff functions for the hanker
and the FIJIC; in effect, the banker’s portfolio
consists of the hank’s assets, whose value is
uncertain before the audit hut known after-
war-d, the bank’s deposits, whose value is known
to be L, and a put option with striking price L
written by the FDIC.” The FDIC, on the other
hand, has effectively written the put option on
the assets of the bank and sold that option to
the banker for the price of the deposit insur-
ance premium.20 The depositor has issued the
bank a risk-free loan, which pays off the amount
L, including accrued interest.
With this in mind, the usefulness of an option
pricing model to evaFuate deposit insurance be-
comes more apparent. An option pricing model
provides an estimate of the actuarial dollar
value of deposit insurance, as well as a tool
with which to analyze the economic incentives
that deposit insurance creates. The depositor,
for example, has a portfolio, I), that is worth, at
the beginning of the year, simply the present
value of the deposit liability discounted at the
riskless rate, Le~T if his year-end payoff, L, is
$1000, and the riskless rate, B, is 8 percent,
then the value of this portfolio at the beginning
“Full coverage is considered first, because it is the simplest
insurance structure possible, and because it approximates
the current system of extensive coverage combined with
the FDIC’s tendency to arrange purchase and assumption
transactions, rather than deposit payouts, for failed banks,
l7The assumptions of a single owner-manager for the bank
and a lone depositor are clearly broad abstractions from
reality. The owner-manager assumption allows us to ignore
principal-agent incentives; see Barnea, Haugen and
Senbet (1985). Similarly, the assumption of a single
depositor effectively precludes the ability of depositors to
withdraw their funds individually without forcing an im-
mediate closure of the bank. Although these are both im-
portant issues, the purpose of the present analysis is to il-
lustrate the general principles involved in the application of
option models to deposit insurance, rather than to model a
bank in its full complexity.
“The bank is defined as economically insolvent when the
market value of its assets is less than the present value of
its liability to the depositor. This terminology is meant to
contrast with an illiquidity, or legal insolvency, which is
brought on by an inability to meet maturing short-term
liabilities with liquid assets. The legal profession has a
separate terminology for these two concepts: the “balance
sheet test” is used to determine economic insolvency, and
the “equity test” is used to determine legal insolvency.
See Symons and White (1984), pp. 603-16, for an exposi-
tion, Since there are no short-term liabilities in the
simplified world here, legal insolvency is not germane.
‘tThe bank’s deposits represent a “short” position, or bor-
rowing, for the banker, The net payoff shown in figure 8
can be gotten by drawing the individual payoff graphs for
the components ofthe portfolio and adding these together
vertically as before. This portfolio is also equivalent, via
put-call parity, to a simple call option on the assets of the
bank.
20Compare figure 9 with figure 3. The insurance premium is
considered a sunk cost at the time of the audit and hence












of the year is $1000-e °‘ = $923.12. The FUIC,
on the other hand, has written a put option
with striking price L — $1000; if, for example,
the standard deviation of the bank’s asset re-
turns is a = 0.3 percent, and the current value
of the bank’s assets is $9&~5,then the value of
the FDIC2s pot-tfolio is given 1w the Black-
Scholes equation as —P — —$85.45.
Of particular interest are the incentives cre-
ated by deposit insurance. Under 100 percent
insurance, the depositor does not care about the
value of the bank’s assets, since he receives his
deposit back with interest, regardless of the
bank’s condition. ‘The hanker, however, receives
Asset Value -- , , , -
the postttve equtty capttal, tf the bank ts solvent;
if the bank is insolvent, the loss is charged to
the FIJIC. This “heads I win, tails you lose” ar-
rangement is certainly not peculiar to banks; it
applies to any corporate entity with limited
stockholder liability. In the absence of other in-
centives, the banket- will make the corpor-ation
as risky as possible.”
What is peculiar to banks undet- 100 percent
fiat-rate deposit insut-ance is the absence of
such other incentives for the depositor and the
hanker to limit risk. Normally, creditors impose
Asset Value a risk premium on corporations, based on the
riskiness of the firm’s assets.22 By definition,
flat-rate insurance implies that the FIJIC charges
no risk premium. Similarly, the depositors
charge no risk premium, because they are fully
insured. The result, in our simplified model, is
that the hanker has an unmitigated incentive to
increase the riskiness of the bank’s assets, while
the FDIC has the invet-se incentive to reduce the
bank’s risk-taking.2’ The risk incentive implied
by extensive, flat-rate deposit insurance is the
impetus for most of the current proposals for
deposit insurance reform.24 In analyzing both
Asset Value the current system and proposed reforms, many
authors have used option pricing models.”
2’Recall that the value of an option to the holder increases
with the volatility of the underlying asset. For the Black
and Scholes model, risk is defined as the standard devia-
tion of the logarithm of the asset’s value,
22This is the function of bond rating services, such as
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, See Barnea, Haugen,
and Senbet, especially pp. 33-35, for an exposition of the
risk-incentive problem.
23Forthis reason, risk-taking is restricted by extensive
regulation of commercial bank activities, In practice, the
banker’s incentive may also be mitigated by the potential
loss of a valuable bank charter or by nonpecuniary factors,
for example, the potential loss of a bank manager’s pro-
fessional reputation in the event of a failure. These factors
are beyond the scope of the option model,
‘4fleform proposals include: risk-based insurance premia,
risk-based capital requirements, larger capital re-
quirements, reduced insurance coverage, depositor co-
insurance, subordinated debt requirements, increased
supervision and more stringent asset regulation. See
White (1989) for a survey of current proposals.
2’See, for example, Merton (1977, 1978), McCulloch (1981,
1985), Sinkey and Miles (1982), Pyle (1983, 1984, 1986),
Brumbaugh and Hemel (1984), Marcus (1984), Marcus and
Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986, 1987), Thomson
(1987), Furlong and Keeley (1987), Pennacchi (1987a,
1987b), Osterberg and Thomson (1988), Flannery (1989a,




,Z4~~’5-We can now extend the options model to
other arrangements for deposit insut-ance, to
evaluate their relative impacts. Two illustrative
cases will be pm’esented: a coverage ceiling clause
and a deductible clause. A significant character-
istic of both these cases is that they impose a
pottion of the hank’s asset risk on the depos-
itor. The FDIC benefits ditectly from such pro-
visions, because they shift some potential losses
directly to the depositors. In addition, imposi-
tion of a possible loss on the depositor mitigates
the risk-incentive problem that exists under 100
percent, flat-rate deposit insurance. In general,
the depositor will monitor the bank more close-
ly and will require a higher interest rate to
compensate for the possibility of default.
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Although 100 pet-cent covet-age is often treated
as the status quo de facto of federal deposit in-
surance, coverage extends legally only to the
first $100,000 per depositor per institution.” A
niaximum coverage limit is a form of co-insur-
ance, a technique used by insurers to reduce
the moral hazard problem (the tendency of in-
surance to alter the behavior of the insured).
Other basic forms of co-insut-ance are the deduct-
ible and fixed proportional sharing of losses.’~
‘l’he applicability of the maximum coverage
limit considered here is comphcated by the
FUIC’s current closure protocol. Bank closures
by the FDIC can take one of two forms: pur-
chase and assumption or deposit payout. Under
a purchase and assumption closure, healthy
assets and a/I deposits are transferred to an-
other healthy bank, with the FIJIC absorbing
the problem assets and any net loss.” This sort
of ttansaction is best modelled by the 100 per-
cent coverage considered above.
Under a deposit payout closure, the FDIC
itself takes all of the bank’s assets amid liabilities
into receivership. It then sells the assets and
pays the depositors up to the maximum cover-
age limit plus any excess of asset sales over in-
surance claims, distributed on a pro rata basis.
As a result, this method is best modelled by the
deductible considered below. ‘I’he upshot is that
the payoffs under the FIJIC’s maximum cover-
age limit do not conform to the familiar (from,
say, automobile or health insurance) maximum
coverage arrangement illustrated here.
Consider a maximumn coverage limit of NI
dollars for the depositor (where NI < L), illus-
trated in figures 11—13. Under this arrange-
inent, the depositor receives the full deposit
amount, L, in the event of any insolvency or
shortfall, up to the amount, NI, of the coverage
limit. Thus, the depositor’s portfolio contains the
deposit amount, L, and he has written a put op-
tion on the bank’s assets with striking price (L
— M). ‘This put option is the result of the max-
imum coverage limit. ‘The FDIC holds the put
option with striking price (L — NI), but has writ-
ten a second put option on the bank’s assets
with striking price L. As before, this put option
(with striking price L) is held by the hanker,
who also owns the assets and owes the amount
I, to the depositot-.
Because of the put option written by the
depositor and held by the FDIC, the depositor
now shares in the risk of the hank’s assets. His
deposit is now worth less, and he will discount
the promised payoff more steeply. Extending
the example given above for the case of 100
percent covet-age, the depositor’s portfolio, which
contained only the riskless deposit, wot-th $932.12
when discounted, is now augmented by the put
option ~-vritten with a striking price of (L — M).
If, for example, the coverage limit is set at NI =
$100, so that the striking price is $900, then
with a = 0.3 percent, B = 8 percent and A —
$985 as before, the I3lack-Scholes value of this
put option to the depositor is —P = — 847.96,
and the total value of his portfolio is D =
26The original limit was $2500 under the Banking Act of
1933; see FDIC (1984), pp. 44, 69. The impact of the
coverage ceiling is limited by the availability of brokered
deposits and by the tendency of the insurer to arrange
purchase and assumption solutions to bank failures.
‘fl’here are other possibilities. For example, deposit in-
surance in the United Kingdom involves fixed proportional
sharing combined with a coverage ceiling [see Llewetlyn
in the United States was to have sharing in staggered pro-
portions Isee FDIC (1984), p. 441. Analyses of co-insurance
tend to focus on proportional sharing arrangements. See
Boyd and Rotnick (1989), and Benston and Kaufman
(1988), ch, 3.
“Defining a “healthy” asset is a difficult chore. The task is
generally accomplished by individual evaluation of assets,
rather than the application of a generic rule,






$932.12 — $47.96 = $884.16. In other words,
given deposit insurance with a $100 coverage
limit, $884.16 is the amount deposited at the
beginning of the year in exchange for a prom-
ised year-end payoff of $1000.
In general, we can use an option pricing
model to solve algebraically for a measure of
the risk premium that the depositor would
charge under this risk-sharing arrangement. On
the one hand, we can think of the deposit as a
riskless deposit combined with a put option. On
the other hand, we can think of it as a single
risky promise of repayment from the banker, to
be discounted at some risk-adjusted interest
rate, r, so that the value of the deposit is:
D = L-e rT We can equate these two inter-
pretations thus:
D = L.e_~<T— P(L — M,A,T,a,B)
= L.etT
where P(s) is the value of the put option before
expiration, as defined, for example, by the
Black-Scholes model, and r is the risk-adjusted
discount rate implied by the presence of the
coverage limit. Given the other variables, we
can rearrange this to find the risk premium:
(2) (r — It) = --iln[ e~T~~~1P(.)1 - B.
TL -~
Applying this to the numerical example, the
stated risk-adjusted interest yield on the deposit is:
r = — In[e-’°’~’t — $47.96 I
$1000.00
= — ln(0.87515) = 13.3%,
implying a risk premium, r — H, of 5.3 percent.
In practical terms, such an estimate of the
magnitude of the risk premium implied by a
given coverage ceiling might be useful in calibra-
ting the degree of market discipline in a reform
of the insurance system. If bank risk-taking is to
be curbed by limiting deposit insurance, forcing
riskier banks to pay higher risk premia as some
have suggested, then the insurance limitations
must be such that the risk premium implied by
Asset Value equation 2 is large enough to make bankers alter
their behavior!’
The magnitude of the risk premium might also
serve as a readily observable vital sign, registering
the financial health of the bank’s assets, and
aiding the regulator in scheduling audits. This
presumes that depositors have some advantage
over regulators in assessing the bank’s risk bet-
ween audits.” Such applications, how-
“For some examples of market discipline proposals, see
Boyd and Rolnick (1989), Gilbert (1990), Gorton and San-
tomero (1988, 1989), or Thomson (1987).
‘°Notethat uninsured or co-insured depositors might find it
more practical to engage in capital rationing, i. e,, limiting
the amount lent to a bank based on that bank’s risk, in
addition to pricing that risk,
L Asset Value
0
L-M I. Asset Value
L-M Lever, are subject to some limitations which at-c
illustrated by the next example.
Another form of co-insut-ance is a deductible.
‘The case of a deductible on insurance coverage
introduces a twist to the problem. Now the
depositor’s portfolio effectively consists of two
put options, one written and one held, in addi-
tion to the promnised repayment of the deposit
with interest. This case is of special interest,
because it applies to a deposit payout closure as
considered above and because it can also he ap-
plied to subordinated debt, which is the object
of a recent debate on sources of mnarket disci-
pline of bank risk-taking. In both cases, the
payoffs to one of the hank’s creditors can he
modeled as a pair of put options with different
striking prices.”
In this example, the depositor is promised the
return of his deposit amount, ivith acci-ued in-
terest, for a total of L dollars. Becamtse of the
deductible ptovision, however, this promised
tepayment is not certain; in the event of the
bank’s insolvency, the depositor will he the first
to share in the shortfall, For year-end asset
levels helow L, the shortfall is deducted from the
depositor’s payoff until the deductible amount, U,
is exhausted. Any shortfall beyond that is ah-
sotbed by the FUIC. Thus, the depositor effec-
tivelv holds the deposit amount L and has writ-
ten a put option with striking price L, that is
held by the hanker; in addition, he holds a put
option with striking price (L — U), which is
written by the FDIC. These payoffs are illus-
trated in figures 14-t6.
The deductible provides a cushion for the
FUIC, which, in the preceding examples, had
written a put option with striking price L
rather than (L — U). The yeat--end payoffs fot
the hanker are the same as before. The real dif-
ference applies to the depositor’s incentives and
the resulting impact on the price he charges the
banker for the deposit. Although he always
prefers a higher asset value, as before, his at-
titude toward the riskiness of the bank’s assets
is now ambiguous, because he is long one put
option and short another, with two diffet-ent














returns increases the value of the long position
and decreases the value of the short position.
As Black and Cox (1976) point out, the net im-
pact of these countervailing forces will depend
on the current asset value relative to the strik-
ing prices. Specifically, there is an inflection
“The relevant creditors in each case are the depositor and
the subordinated debt-holder, respectively. For an analysis
of option models in the case of subordinated debt, see
Black and Cox (1976) and Gorton and Santomero (1988,
1989). For an analysis of subordinated debt and bank
regulation, see Gilbert (1990). The approach here is at
odds with that of Ronn and Verma (1986), who calculate
the value for a single put on total debt and then scale that
value down by the proportion of insured to total liabilities,
L Asset Value
Asset Value
L-U L Asset Valuepoint equal to the discounted geometric mean
of the two striking prices.” For an asset value
above the inflection point, which includes all
cases in which the bank is solvent (i. e., A >
L.e~T), the effect of the short position out-
weighs that of the long position, and the de-
positor will prefer less risk. Conversely, when
the current market value of assets falls below
the inflection point, the long position outweighs
the short, and the depositor would prefer a
riskier asset portfolio, given the low asset value.
‘Thus, a decrease in the “risk premium” charged
by the depositot no longer necessarily implies
that the bank’s assets are less risky; for exam-
ple, such a decrease could instead be the result
of an increase in the current asset value and an
increase in the volatility of those assets.
Under such circumstances, it is a reasonable
taxonomic question whether the interest rate
markup over the riskless rate should be called a
risk premium at all. The current value of the
depositor’s claim and the implicit risk premium
can be calculated as before:
D = L.e~T_ P(L,A,T,a,R) + P(L—U,A,T,o,R)
value of the deposit resembles more and more
the staggered year-end payoff function of figure
16. In fact, if the year-end payoff of figure 16 is
scaled down by the risk-free present value dis-
count factor, ~i t becomes identical to the
extreme case of figure 17 where a = 0. Figure
17 also illustrates graphically the Black and Cox
argument that for some (higher) asset levels, de-
positors will charge a risk premium, while for
other (lower) levels, they will offer a risk discount.
It is also clear from the picture, however, that
the asset level has a much more significant effect
on the value of the claim than does the volatili-
ty.’4 All of this suggests that bankers, depositors
and pollcymakers should give considerable care to
an appropriate definition of risk in this context,
and that similar care should be given to designing
a practical measure of that risk. Risk defined as
volatility in bank asset returns and measured by
the risk premium charged on equity, subor-
dinated debt or uninsured deposits may not be
apt for the tasks to which it has been applied.
= L.e’~T SOM1~CAVEATE
(r - B) =
— I lnfeRT_ ~ IP(L,°)- P(L — U,~)11 — H,
T ( Lt JJ
but the risk premiumn so defined is a measure
of the expected difference between cash pro-
mised, L, and cash ultimately received. It is a
poor measure of the volatility of the returns on
the bank’s assets, because the expected dif-
ference between cash promised and cash re-
ceived depends on several factors and is no
longer a simple direct relation of the volatility
of assets.
Figure 17 graphs the value of the depositor’s
claim for a range of asset levels arid volatili-
ties.” In interpreting this graph, note the con-
nection between it and figure 16. In particular,
as the volatility, a, goes to zero in figure 17, the
The preceding analysis has ifiustrated some uses
of option pricing models in evaluating deposit in-
surance. There are some limitations, however, on
the use of options models in this context. Most of
these limitations derive from the assumptions that
form the basis for the option pricing equation,
and the extent to which these assumptions are
valid for the case at hand.
Perhaps the most basic problem is the ques-
tion, who truly holds the option.” Until now, it
has been presumed, based on the end-of-period
payoffs, that deposit insurance represents a put
option written by the FDIC and held by the
banker. In fact, however, the FDIC decides
whether a bank is insolvent, and, more impor-
tantly, whether to close a bank that is already
insolvent (or one that is not quite insolvent).” In
the face of a large-scale bank failure or run,
“The discount rate used to calculate this inflection point in-
cludes a risk premium. Since all other discounting in this
context is at the riskless rate, this means that the inflec-
tion point can fall below the present value of the lower dis-
count rate, (L — i;)-e’1, if the risk premium, o’/2. is large
enough. Forthe same reason, the inflection point is
always smaller than the solvency point, L.e~r,
~ riskiess rate was set at 8 percent, time to maturity
was one year, promised repayment was $1000, and the
deductible amount was $200. Similar graphs with other
maturities and deductible amounts reveal no surprises.
‘~This fact is noted by Pyle (1983), p. IS.
“This issue is addressed by Brumbaugh and Hemel (1984)
and Allen and Saunders (1990).
“Recall that the definition of insolvency used in this paper
ignores the possibility that the bank might be deemed in-
solvent on the basis of its current ratio — i. e., its inability
to meet maturing liabilities with liquid assets. This problem
relates to the maturity structure of the bank’s portfolio,
which will be considered briefly below.L-e —RI =923.12
(L-U)-e ~ =738.49
0
short-term political considerations may over-
whelm any prior prescriptions on closure poli-
cy. The FSLIC’s actions in the thrift crisis in-
dicate that this is not idle speculation; numerous
thrifts were left open long after their insolvency
had been discovered. Conversely, as Benston
and Kaufman (1988) suggest, the FDIC could
close solvent banks, if they have come close
enough to insolvency. lf the insuret- were to
follow scm’upulously a well-defined rule one way
or the other, there would he little at issue, since
the striking price and year-end payoffs could
then be easily adjusted within the context of the
current model. As matters stand, however,
bankers and depositors effectively face a ran-
dom striking price, because the insurer decides
if the option will he exercised. As a practical
matter, it is difficult to envision how such a
well-defined closure rule might be im-
plemented.’~
A related issue is the measurement of bank
asset values. The option pricing model pre-
sented above presumes that the current asset
price can be readily observed. For stock op-
tions, this is an uncontentious assumption,
because stock prices can be observed on the
floor of the exchange or in the over-the-counter
market. For an option on the assets of the bank,
ho%vever, the relevant pt-ice is not readily obser-
vable. Indeed, one of the primary functions of
bank ct-edit analysis is to assign values to assets
for which there is no active market. Similarly,
‘7A rule is well-defined if it leaves no doubt about the cir-
cumstances which imply closure, with no room for FOIC
discretion. Note that defining a closure rule, in general, is
not sufficient for our purposes; the closure rule must be
defined so that the values of the resultant claims conform
to the values given by the option pricing equation.
Figure 17







738.49 Athe insurer must invest significant effort, in the
form of an audit, to determine the year-end
asset value.
The inherent inaccessibility of bank asset values
has two implications for option models. First, it
is no longer possible for an option holder to
construct the appropriately hedged portfolio
described in the Black and Scholes derivation,
because the hedge ratio depends on the value of
the underlying asset. This casts doubt upon the
appropriateness of the riskless rate in discoun-
ting the expected end-of-period payoffs.’8 Se-
cond, the current asset value is important, be-
cause it partly determines the probabilities for
the various end-of-period payoffs. Ignorance of
the current asset value adds another layer of
uncertainty, and this additional uncertainty
significantly affects the value of the option.”
A closely related issue is the measurement of
asset risk. The option pricing models presented
here use the variance of the asset’s returns as a
measure of risk.~° Producing an accurate assess-
ment of the variance is problematic, even for
stock options, because the volatility that matters
is the variance of the process over the future
life of the option. For bank assets, the measure-
ment problem is compounded, because even
past values are generally unavailable. Pyle (1983)
and Flannery (1989b) consider some of the im-
plications of this problem in using the option
models to price deposit insurance.
Just as asset values and the volatility of re-
turns are not obsem’vable directly, there is the
more general moot question of which stochastic
returns-generating process should be incor-
porated in the option pricing model. As we’ve
seen above, the difference in the assumed re-
turns process between Black and Scholes’s
model and Merton’s model resulted in a
substantially different pricing equation.
Although the choice of an appropriate returns
process for modeling a bank’s assets is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to note
“One might resort to the argument that the riskless rate is
appropriate if the asset has no idiosyncratic (that is, firm-
specific) risk, as noted in the context of Merton’s (1976)
pricing model (see the shaded insert), but such an
assumption is not particularly credible for bank asset port-
folios, prima fade.
“See Pyle (1983) for an analysis of asset value uncertainty.
Figlewski (1989) and Sabbel (1989) consider the im-
possibility of hedging, along with many other difficulties in
the application of stock option pricing models,
40Merton’s (1976) approach uses that variance together with
the parameters of the jump distributions.
that this choice is a salient factor in the option’s
value, because it determines the probability of
each of the possible year-end payoffs.
The empirical evidence to date testifies to the
sensitivity of the results to the specification
employed. Marcus and Shaked (1984) use the
basic Black-Scholes model, adjusted for divi-
dends, and find that federal deposit insurance
is currently substantially overpriced relative to
the “actuarially fair” estimates provided by their
option model.” They note, however, that
“McCulloch’s (1981, 1983) estimates of insurance
values derived from the Paretian-stable distribu-
tion greatly exceed” their own.4’ Pennacchi
(1987b) uses a more complicated model which
includes the degree of regulatory control wield-
ed by the insurer. He finds that deposit insur-
ance may be either overpriced or underpriced,
depending on the level of regulation assumed.
McCulloch’s (1985) study assumes non-normal,
Paretian-stable asset returns and non-stationary
random interest rates. He finds that insurance
values are highly sensitive to the level and
volatility of interest rates. Ronn and Verma
(1986), however, using a variant of Merton’s
(1977) model, conclude that neither random in-
terest rates nor non-stationary equity returns
significantly affect the insurance valuations. In
brief, the empirical evidence suggests that a
wide range of insurance valuations can be
reached by varying the returns process em-
ployed in the model.
Finally, it has been assumed in the preceding
examples that there is a single deposit that does
not mature until the end of the year. In fact, of
course, banks maintain many deposit accounts
with a wide range of maturities, starting with
the instant maturity of demand deposits. This is
significant, because it gives many depositors
another type of insurance. A depositor who can
withdraw his funds from a failing bank sooner
than the FDIC can close it has 100 percent in-
surance, regardless of the balance in the ac-
count or the insurance scheme in effect.” The
41For an exposition of the dividend adjustment to the Black-
Scholes model, see Merton (1973).
“Marcus and Shaked (1984), p. 449. Their reference to
McCulloch 0983) was a working paper, later published as
McCulloch (1985).
~‘lt need only be the case that the bank funds the deposit
outflow somehow, for example, through a fire sale of its
assets, Such a run on Continental Illinois by institutional
depositors prompted the FDIC to extend 100 percent in-
surance to uninsured depositors.result is that the simple application of an option
pricing model does not provide an accurate
evaluation of such deposits, because it ignores
certain relevant strategies.
The usefulness of option models in the study
of deposit insurance results from two important
characteristics. First, these models distill the
host of economic factors involved down to a
handful of relevant parametet’s whose interac-
tion is well-defined by the option-pricing equa-
tion. Second, they are able to evaluate deposit
insurance claims under a wide variety of in-
surance structures. Although only three such
structures were elaborated here, they can be
generalized to other applications. Thus, option
models provide a unified context for analyzing
incentives within an insurance structure, as well
as for comparing alternative insurance schemes.
Unfortunately, option pricing models, like
most economic models, are an imperfect tool
when directly applied to the complexities of the
real world. Beyond certain fundamental qualita-
tive results, there are theoretical and empirical
reasons to believe that the insurance valuations
given by any particular option pricing model
will be incorrect, highly sensitive to changes in
their specification, or both. As a result, the ab-
solute dollar magnitudes provided by options
models of the value of deposit insurance are
suspect. The contradictory empirical evidence
on fair pricing is indicative of this problem.
In defense of these models, however, there is
no reason to believe that option models are any
worse in this regard than any alternative
economic model. Indeed, there is some reason
to believe that, although the absolute magnitude
of the valuations provided by option models
may be unstable, the rankings they provide for
a sample of banks are not.44 Similarly, inac-
curacies in determining the scale of insurance
values do not deny the ability of option models
to identify the direction of incentives or the im-
pact of marginal changes in the structure of
deposit insurance. Therefore, used judiciously,
option pricing models can be an effective ana-
lytical tool in the study of deposit insurance.
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